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French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect two types of 
directors  to  represent  employees.  First,  partially  privatized  companies  must  reserve  two  or  three 
(depending  on  board  size)  board  seats  for  directors  elected  by  employees  by  right  of  employment. 
Second, employee-shareholders in any public company have the right to elect one director whenever they 
hold  at  least  3%  of  outstanding  shares.  These  two  rights  have  engendered  substantial  employee 
representation on the boards of over one-quarter of the largest French companies. Using a comprehensive 
sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2005, we examine 
the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization 
and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders unambiguously increase firm 
valuation  and  profitability,  but  do  not  significantly  impact  corporate  payout  (dividends  and  share 
repurchases) policy or board organization and performance. Directors elected by employees by right 
significantly reduce payout ratios, increase overall staff costs, and increase board size, complexity, and 
meeting frequency—but do not significantly impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation 
on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and even value-enhancing in the case of 
directors elected by employee shareholders. 
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Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Should  employees  be  allocated  control  rights  in  the  companies  for  which  they  work?  This 
question has long been debated, but has picked up impetus recently as societies have struggled to balance 
worker rights with effective corporate governance. While the collapse of communism has removed the 
most  extreme  examples  of  (at  least  theoretical)  employee  ownership,  Germany  and  other  countries 
mandate  that  workers  be  represented  on  corporate  boards,  and  most  western  democracies  encourage 
employee share ownership through tax, compensation, and pension policies. However, it is still unclear 
whether employee ownership or representation on the corporate board of directors increases firm value or 
productivity. This study exploits a natural experiment in mandated employee representation conducted in 
France--a major western country with both a market economy and a long tradition of robust worker 
employment protection—to determine whether giving workers control rights without cost creates value, 
and whether directors elected by employees who are also shareholders have a differential impact on firm 
value than do directors elected by workers as a right of employment. 
French  law  mandates  that  employees  of  large  publicly  listed  companies  be  allowed  to  elect 
directors for two reasons. First, partially privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on 
board size) board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment. Since privatized firms 
are  easily  the  largest  and  most  valuable  companies  in  France,  this  requirement  induces  significant 
representation on the boards of an important and highly visible group of companies by directors elected 
by workers who are not also shareholders.  Second, employee-shareholders in any publicly listed firm 
have the legal right to elect one director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. This 
theoretical right has, however, never been strenuously enforced, so companies effectively are encouraged 
but not required to allow employee-shareholders to elect one or more directors. Additionally, French law 
allows but does not mandate that listed firms may adopt a two-tiered supervisory and management board 
structure, as per the German model, and may also choose to combine the posts of CEO and Chairman of 
the Board of Directors—as is typical for American companies--or to keep these positions separate, as is 
the model in most other developed economies. Taken together, these regulations and governance options 
have  engendered  employee  representation  on  the  boards  of  over  one-quarter  of  the  largest  French 
companies, but have also created significant cross-sectional variation in the extent and type of employee 
board representation, in the use of single-versus-two-tiered boards, and in the combined-versus-separate 
CEO and board chair positions. This provides a unique institutional setting for empirical analysis.    - 3 -
Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index 
from  1998  to  2005,  we  study  the  financial  impact  of  the  two  types  of  employee  representation. 
Specifically, we examine how these choices influence corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal 
board  organization  and  performance.  We  find  that  directors  elected  by  employee  shareholders 
unambiguously increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout 
(dividends and share repurchases) policy or board organization and performance. Directors elected by 
employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, increase overall staff costs, and increase board size, 
complexity,  and  meeting  frequency—but  do  not  significantly  impact  firm  value  or  profitability.  Our 
robustness checks also indicate that when the firm’s employees are represented by the most radical left-
wing unions (CGT, FO, CFDT, CFTC, or CFE-CGC) payout is significantly reduced, but the impact on 
corporate valuation is unaffected and profitability is significantly increased, probably due to a more 
structured and demanding work environment when these unions are involved in corporate governance and 
industrial relations. On balance, employee representation on corporate boards seems to be at least value-
neutral, and may actually increase firm valuation and profitability when employee-shareholders elect 
company directors.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on employee ownership and 
corporate board representation, while section 3 describes the French institutional background and the laws 
mandating  different  types  of  employee  representation.  Section  4  describes  our  sample  and  presents 
univariate  analyses  of  the  impact  of  the  two  types  of  employee  board  representation  on  corporate 
valuation,  financial  policies,  and  internal  board  organization  and  performance.  Section  5  presents 
regression analyses of these effects, while section 6 presents robustness checks, adjusts for endogeneity, 
and discusses the implications of the study’s key findings. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Literature review 
 
Several  streams  of  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  inform  our  study.  There  is  a  general 
literature  on  organization and  optimal  control  of  corporations that  draws  principally  on  the  work  of 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Alchian and Demsetz show that, when 
there is perfect information, control rights should optimally be entrusted in one agent, the firm’s owner. 
Jensen and Meckling show that agency problems arise whenever there is a separation of ownership and 
control and that institutional arrangements arise to ameliorate these costs. These seminal articles laid the 
foundations for the modern theory of corporate governance in public companies, as developed by Fama 
(1980), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Fama and Jensen (1983a, b), Jensen (1986), Stulz (1988), and others.   - 4 -
This literature was summarized generally in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and in the international context in 
Denis and McConnell (2003). 
There is also a substantial stream of research examining the specific issue of labor managed firms 
and  the  German  Codetermination  policy  that  mandates  substantial  worker  representation  (reserving 
between one-third and one-half of board seats) on the boards of publicly listed companies. The most 
influential—and  decidedly  hostile--early  analysis  of  labor  managed  firms  and  codetermination  was 
presented in Jensen and Meckling (1979), who described the organizational, contracting, and commitment 
problems they predict must naturally arise when labor is made the owner/manager of corporate assets. 
These authors also make the simple but devastatingly insightful observation that the best evidence against 
the viability of labor managed and codetermined firms is that these are never observed except where 
mandated by law—and even where mandated Jensen and Meckling assert that corporations expend great 
time and energy trying to escape the strictures imposed by this format.  
More recently, however, several researchers have suggested that employee participation in firm 
governance can be value-enhancing, at least under certain conditions. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2007) 
predict that stakeholder-oriented firms, that are concerned with employees and suppliers in addition to 
shareholders, will often prosper in competition with purely shareholder-oriented firms, and Claessens and 
Ueda (2008) present empirical evidence supporting this prediction. Galai and Weiner (2008) make a 
similar prediction regarding the optimal allocation of board representation for companies confronting 
economic or financial distress. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2008) point to the critical monitoring role that 
highly productive, but non-executive employees can play in constraining any self-serving actions by 
senior managers, even in the absence of external governance. Finally, Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2008), and Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2008) all predict that insider-dominated boards may have 
some competitive advantages over boards consisting principally of disinterested outsiders.     
The  German  system  of  codetermination  is  analyzed  theoretically  and  empirically  in  several 
studies.  As  described  in  Fauver  and  Fuerst  (2006),  the  system  of  Mitbestimmungrecht  (right  of 
codetermination) began in 1951 for mining, coal, and steel companies, and was extended to all firms with 
more than 2000 workers in 1976. This policy requires that workers receive one-half of all seats on the 
supervisory board (Aufsichgtrat) of German Aktiengesellschaft (AG), or publicly traded companies. A 
separate law mandates that workers receive one-third of board seats in companies with between 500 and 
2000 workers, and various supplemental regulations have narrowed the scope for German companies to 
escape these codetermination strictures. 
Fauver  and  Fuerst  (2006)  also  present  the  most  compelling  empirical  study  supporting  the 
proposition  that  codetermination  may  actually  create  value  by  conferring  first-hand  operational 
knowledge to corporate decision-making. Using a comprehensive sample of listed German companies in   - 5 -
2003, they document that 51% have employee representation. While the median level of representation is 
one-third of board seats, over one-third of companies with representation show higher levels than legally 
required. Fauver and Fuerst show that firms with employee representation are consistently larger, more 
profitable and more likely to pay dividends than are companies without worker representation. They also 
find that Tobin’s Q is significantly higher for firms with greater employee representation in industries that 
demand high levels of coordination—principally industries with complex supply chains.  
Several other studies describe, and applaud, the workings of Germany’s codetermination system, 
including Furubotn and Wiggins (1984), Levine and Tyson (1990), Freeman and Lazear (1995), and 
Allen and Gale (2002). However, most empirical studies that explicitly analyze the German model reach 
conclusions similar to those foreshadowed by Jensen and Meckling (1979). As did Jensen and Meckling, 
Roe (1998) proposes that high levels of mandated employee representation will diminish supervisory 
board power and encourage shareholders and managers to circumvent employee-directors in decision-
making. One way to do this is to construct concentrated ownership blocks held by founding families or 
banks, and many authors—including Roe (1998), Becht and Böehmer (1997), Franks and Mayer (2001), 
and Gorton and Schmid (2000)--confirm high levels of ownership concentration in Germany. Gorton and 
Schmid (2004) examine German companies with equal representation by employees and shareholders, 
and find that these companies trade at a 31% market discount compared to companies where employee 
representatives fill only one-third of the supervisory board seats. Interestingly, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) 
also find diminishing returns to employee representation over the level of one-third of board seats, though 
they conclude greater representation still creates value. 
Several studies examine the impact of employee stock ownership and board representation in the 
United States, with generally inconclusive results. Most of this research studies the adoption of employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOPs) either using event study techniques or by employing accounting and stock 
return measures to test whether financial performance improves after plan adoption. Event study tests that 
document positive announcement period returns around ESOP adoption include Chang (1990), Faria, 
Trahan,  and  Rogers  (1993),  and  Beatty  (1995),  while  Gordon  and  Pound  (1990)  find  insignificant 
announcement  period  returns.  Studies  examining  the  taxation  and  accounting  implications  of  ESOP 
adoption include Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990), Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Beatty (1995), and most 
recently, Kim and Ouimet (2008). Kim and Ouimet document that firms adopting small (less than 5% of 
outstanding shares) ESOPs experience a significant increase in firm value, but companies adopting larger 
plans do not.  They show that employees in companies adopting large plans are able to capture all the 
benefits resulting from ESOP-induced productivity increases in the form of higher wages and benefits, 
whereas shareholders capture the productivity returns resulting from adoption of small plans.     - 6 -
The most comprehensive, and damning, analysis of the impact of labor voice on American public 
companies is provided by Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006). They compare the valuation and financial 
performance of a sample of 255 “labor voice firms,” in which employee ownership exceeds 5% (and 
labor representatives, rather than managers, vote the employee shares), to a control sample of companies 
with employee ownership of less than 5%. Compared to the control sample, labor voice firms have lower 
Tobin’s Q, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and 
exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. They model labor’s contractual stream of wages as 
similar to risky debt in that it consists of a fixed claim on the firm—the promised stream of wages and 
benefits—less a put option with the exercise price equal to the value of labor’s claim in bankruptcy. 
Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck posit that labor will maximize the combined value of the fixed claim and 
the put option, and will encourage policies contrary to shareholder wealth maximization. 
A final related stream of research examines how managers might deliberately form coalitions 
with workers to protect the firm (and their own jobs) from a hostile takeover. Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
model this tendency of managers to enlist workers as allies, and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), 
Atanassov and Kim (2008), and Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2008) document a 
tendency for managers who are insulated from takeovers—through the influence, respectively, of U.S. 
state business combination laws and concentrated personal share ownership of Swedish managers—to 
pursue the “quiet life” by paying workers higher than necessary wages and by monitoring employees less 
intensively.    
 
3.   French law and employee representation on corporate boards 
 
Though  partly  inspired  by  Germany’s  codetermination  model,  the  French  employee 
representation system was launched three decades later and has evolved quite differently. The first such 
piece of legislation was the July 23, 1983 Law, passed by a left-wing government, that allowed worker 
representation on the board of directors of state-controlled companies (where the state owns more than 
50% of the share capital).  Depending on the total number of workers, employee-selected directors can 
represent up to one third of the members of the board. Three years later, the Ordonnance 21 Octobre 
1986 allowed privately owned firms to change their statutes to have employees elected on the board.
1 To 
                                                 
1 The ordonnance specifically states that “The number of these directors cannot be higher than five, nor exceed one 
third of the number of the other directors. When the number of the directors elected by the employees is equal or 
higher than two, the ‘engineers and managers’ have at least one seat.” The directors elected by the employees are not 
taken into account for the determination of the minimal number and the maximum number directors envisaged in 
article 89 – 3 and 18.    - 7 -
date, however, this option has never been adopted by any large publicly traded company that was not 
once state-owned.  
The Law of July 25, 1994 mandated that the statutes of the company being privatized should be 
modified before sale to reserve a certain number of seats on the board of directors for the representatives 
of employees. The specific required reservations were: (1) two seats for the representatives of the labour 
force as a whole and one seat for the shareholder employees if the board of directors is made up of less 
than 15 members; and (2) three seats for the representatives of the labour force as a whole and one for the 
shareholder employees if the board of directors consists of more than 15 members. However, once the 
company was privatized, shareholders could again change the firm’s statutes to cancel the reserved seats 
for employee representatives on the board. This same law obliges companies, in which employees hold at 
least 5% of the capital, to submit to a vote of the general meeting a resolution giving one or more seats to 
directors  representing  employees  (in  addition  to  elected  employees  on  the  board),  though  the  other 
shareholders could agree or disagree. The Law of February 19, 2001 reduces the previous threshold of 
5% to 3%. 
The Law of January 17, 2002 went further, mandating that an employee director had to be 
nominated when employee ownership exceeds 3%, not just that such a proposal had to be submitted for a 
vote at the general meeting. However, the companies whose board of directors already includes one or 
more directors who are members of the board of the employees’ mutual funds or one or more employees 
elected are not obliged to nominate another employee representative. 
As we show later, this law truly seems to have promoted board representation for employee-
shareholders, as the fraction of companies with such directors increases sharply after 2001. In many 
companies (such as Alcatel, Vivendi, and Total), it is the president of the employee mutual fund who sits 
on the board. On the other hand, this law did not by itself prompt universal compliance, as implementing 
decrees and regulations were not immediately passed—and indeed remain unspecified to this day. Several 
CEOs were reluctant to nominate new directors representing employee-shareholders, in particular in cases 
where employees were already represented on the board by director elected by employees as a right (in 
privatized companies). For example, shareholder-employees of Société Générale are not represented on 
the board, even though they hold 7% of the capital and 12.2% of the voting rights. This suggests that 
managers are generally unwilling to promote increased employee board representation unless compelled 
by law to do so, especially when there are already directors elected (by right) to represent workers. 
Privately owned firms (those that were never state-owned) can choose to have elected employees 
as  directors,  but  never  do.  These  companies  are  supposed  to  nominate  a  shareholder  employee  if 
employee ownership is at least 3%, but few have done so since there is as yet no sanction for violating 
this mandate. Privatized firms sold before 1993 that are no longer state owned face requirements similar   - 8 -
to  the  ones  that  private  companies  face.  Firms  privatized  after  1994  were  obliged  at  the  date  of 
privatization to have 2 or 3 elected employees on the board, depending on the size of the board, plus one 
shareholder employee, but they could change their statutes whenever they wanted after being privatized.  
Several privatized companies deleted one or both classes of employee representatives when they 
merged with other firms. As examples, employee directorships on the board of Elf Aquitaine were not 
taken onto the board of Total when these two companies merged. The same occurred when Pechiney was 
purchased by Alcan or when Aventis (including formerly state-owned Rhône Poulenc) was bought by 
Sanofi. In fact, almost half of all formerly state-owned companies dropped their employee representatives 
from their combined boards after merging.  
Few  companies  explicitly  voted  to  delete  employee  representation  by  non-shareholding 
employees in isolation (not as a result of merger or recapitalization). One company that did was Saint 
Gobain, which had two elected employees on the board until 1998. It proposed to the 1999 extraordinary 
general meeting (2/3 majority required) to cancel the requirement to have elected employees on the board. 
Shareholders agreed and from 1999 Saint-Gobain had no more employee-elected directors. The document 
submitted to vote explicitly said “ending the transitory period that began with privatization, we propose 
to…” Even with the deletions resulting from mergers and explicit votes, however, we will show that 
employee representation is far higher in formerly state-owned companies than in those that have always 
been private, and significantly higher in recently privatized companies than in those divested before 1994.  
 
4.  Data and univariate results 
 
The sample of firms is drawn from the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index and 
includes 156 unique firms covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005. The SBF 120 Index 
regroups the 120 largest companies by market capitalisation and by trading volumes on Euronext Paris. 
Overall, 207 firm-year observations (20.20% of the sample) have employee directors on their boards. 126 
firm-year  observations  (12.29%  of  the  sample)  have  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-
shareholders and 128 (12.49%) have directors elected by right by employees, so 47 firm-years (4.59%) 
have both types of employee representatives on their boards. 
Figure 1 shows the time trend of the percent of SBF 120 firms with employee directors and the 
percent of employee directors on boards from 1998 to 2005. Panels A and B report that while the percent 
of directors elected by right by employees on corporate boards remains quite stable over the study period, 
there is a continuous increase in the fraction of firms with employee-shareholder directors and in the 
fraction  of  all  board  seats  they  command—and  these  trends  accelerate  after  2001.  This  observation 
reflects  the  emergence  of  better  governance  practices,  such  as the  introduction  of  more  women  and   - 9 -
outside directors on corporate boards of directors, and the general promotion of employee ownership in 
companies.  For  example,  Euronext  and  the  Fédération  Française  des  Associations  d’Actionnaires 
Salariés et d’Anciens Salariés (FAS) launched the first employee shareholding index in the world in 
December  2006.  This  index  is  composed  of  all  SBF  250  stocks  having  a  significant  percentage  of 
employee shareholding—defined as at least 3% of the company’s stocks being owned by more than three-
fourths of its employees. 
**** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
The  largest  company  with  directors  elected  by  right  by  employees  is  BNP  Paribas  (Banque 
Nationale de Paris); these directors accounted for 19% of its board in 2005. The largest company to have 
directors elected by employee-shareholders is the insurer AXA, which in 2005 had a board where such 
directors accounted for 8% of all seats. The company with the highest percentage of employee directors 
on its board is Air France, with a fraction of 41% in 2000. More accurately, the company which has the 
highest fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board is Air France in 2000 with a 
fraction  of  0.35.  Finally,  the  company  with  the  highest  fraction  of  directors  elected  by  employee-
shareholders is Essilor International, with 27% in 2000.  
Data on corporate boards is extracted from registration documents available on the Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF) website, on the Thomson One Banker database or on the Internet websites of 
individual  companies.  In  some  cases,  we  use  “Rapports  de  contrôle  interne  et  de  gouvernement 
d’entreprise” available on the AMF website. 
Information  displayed  in  registration  documents  or  in  annual  reports  is  not  always  accurate, 
especially for years before 2001. After that year, new regulations forced companies to publish more 
details  on  the  composition  of  their  boards.  Several  databases  have  been  used  to  fill  in  missing 
biographical information of directors (such as gender, age, nationality, academic background), including 
“Who’s Who”, “Guide des Etats-Majors des Grandes Entreprises” and press issues available from the 
Factiva database and other Internet sites. 
In order to accurately count the number of outside directorships held by directors, we count only 
directorships in other listed companies as listed in the Dafsaliens database. Even though this indicator 
may be biased downwards, this choice was necessitated by the fact that companies consistently report 
only directorships in listed companies in their published documents. We decide whether directors are 
dependent or independent using the criteria presented by Viénot (1995, 1999) and Bouton (2002), who 
define independent directors as directors who “do not have any links with the company, its group or 
management liable to affect their unbiased judgement.” 
Economic and financial data have been collected from the Worldscope database. Other sources of 
information or databases have been used in some cases, such as registration documents and annual reports   - 10 -
and the Diane and Stockproinfo databases. For most of our multivariate tests, we follow La Porta et al. 
(2000) and Faccio et al. (2001), and exclude firms with negative net income, negative cash flow and firms 
whose dividends exceed sales. 
 
4.1.  Firm, ownership, and board variables 
Table 1 defines the firm, ownership, and board variables used in our tests and regressions. The 
firm variables used in this article are the following: SIZE is the book value of total assets in euro billions. 
LSIZE is the natural log of book value of assets; LEVERAGE is measured as total debt over total assets; 
TANGIBLE is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets;  ROA  is the return on  assets  measured  as  operating  income  over  total assets;  QTOBIN  is the 
Tobin’s Q defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets; MTB is the market-to-book ratio 
measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, 
all divided by the book value of total assets; and GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage 
change in net sales for two years. PAYOUT is the dividend payout constructed as a ratio of total cash 
dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to earnings after taxes but before extraordinary 
items; DIV/SALES is the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net sales; 
REP/NETINC is the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income; REP/SALES is the ratio of share 
repurchase amounts to net sales; CREP/NETINC is the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and 
preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net income; and CREP/SALES is the ratio of cash 
dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net sales. AGE is 
the firm age in years; EO is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total 
shares outstanding; FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the families to total 
shares outstanding; STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to 
total shares outstanding; CEO/CHAIR is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board, and zero otherwise; SUPERVISORY is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual 
structure (Conseil de surveillance and Directoire), and zero if the firm has a single board of directors 
(Conseil d’administration); BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the board; and WOMEN is the 
fraction of women on the board. MEETINGS is the annual number of board meetings (excludes actions by 
written consent of the directors and telephonic meetings of the board), as described in Vafeas (1999); 
COMMITTEES is the total number of standing board committees, and DSHIPS is the average number of 
directorships in listed companies which is the total number of directorship posts held by directors in listed 
companies,  excluding  the  directorship  in  the  sample  firm,  divided  by  the  total  number  of  directors. 
PEMPLOYEES is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board;   - 11 -
PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board; and PEMPSHARE is 
the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. 
 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
France seems to be the only major country to offer the opportunity of choosing either a single or 
dual-board structure for any corporate firm, even when listed. The 1966 French Business Law allows 
corporate firms (Sociétés Anonymes) to choose between two different corporate governance systems. 
These are: (1) A one-board system, relying on a board of directors (Conseil d’administration), elected at 
the  general  meeting  of  shareholders.  The  board  of  directors  appoints  a  Chairman/CEO  (Président 
Directeur Général) charged with the day-to-day running of the company. Since 2001 (law of the 15 May 
2001, called NRE = Nouvelles régulations économiques = new economic regulation), companies are 
allowed to appoint a CEO who is not the chairman of the board. CEO/CHAIR is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. (2) A two-board system relying 
on a Supervisory board (Conseil de surveillance) and a management board (Directoire). As in the one-
board  system,  the  members  of  the  supervisory  board  are  shareholders  appointed  by  vote  at  the 
shareholders’  general  meeting.  The  supervisory  board  then  appoints  the  management  board,  whose 
members do not necessarily own shares in the company. This board is in charge of the day-to-day running 
of the company but has stricter reporting obligations than the Chairman/CEO in the one-board system.  
 
4.2.  Industrial breakdown of sample firms 
Table 2 describes the industrial breakdown of the firms that are included in the SBF 120 over 
1998-2005. Manufacturing accounts for easily the largest fraction (44.4%) of all firm-year observations, 
while  agriculture,  mining,  and  construction  account  for  the  smallest  (5.9%).  Business  and  personal 
services represent one-fifth (20.0%) of all observations, while wholesale and retail trade, finance, and the 
transportation,  communications  and  utilities  sectors  account  for  about  13%  of  all  observations, 
respectively. 
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
  We should note again that privatized firms are extremely important in France, and 233 of all firm-
year  observations  (22.9%)  are  of  fully  or  partially  privatized  companies.  These  are  heavily  over-
represented among the very largest companies in the SBF every year and for the entire 1998-2005 study 
period.  Roughly  two-thirds  (155  of  233)  of  the  firm-year  observations  are  for  companies  that  were 
privatized less than ten years before the observation year, while the remaining one-third (78 observations) 
are for companies privatized more than ten years previously. The French state owns an average (median) 
19.49% (4.47%) of the stock of companies that were privatized recently, while the state owns only an   - 12 -
average (median) 1.70% (0%) of the companies privatized more than 10 years previously. 786 firm-year 
observations are for companies that were never state-owned, though the French state still owns an average 
1.10% (0%) of the stock of these firms.
2 State ownership declines monotonically with time after the initial 
privatization sale. 
 
4.3.   Univariate analyses 
As a first look at how firms with employee directors differ from other large French companies, 
we perform univariate comparisons. These are presented in Table 3. The first column of data presents 
mean and  median values for the full sample of SBF 120 firms for 1998-2005, while the next three 
columns present comparisons of firms with (1) and without (0) any types of employee-directors; firms 
with and without employee-directors elected by right; and firms with and without directors elected by 
employee-shareholders. Univariate tests are reported for the test for equality of means (Student-t test) and 
the  test  for  equality  of  medians  (Wilcoxon  test)  between  firms  having  employee  directors,  directors 
elected from among the employees or from among the employee-shareholders, and firms which don’t 
have these characteristics.  
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
  Not surprisingly, SBF 120 firms are very large, as measured by the book value of assets, with an 
overall average (median) size for all firm-year observations of €32.92 billion (€3.20 billion). Firms with 
all types of employee-directors are highly significantly larger than those without, and firms with directors 
elected by employees by right are the largest of all. This is unsurprising, since these tend to be recently 
privatized companies. The average (median) book-value leverage ratio for the entire sample is 25.8% 
(25.7%), and there is no significant difference in leverage ratios between any groups based on whether 
they have employee directors.  
  The full sample average (median) ratio of tangible to all assets is 22.1% (14.9%), and firms 
without employee directors have significantly higher tangible asset ratios than all categories of firms with 
employee-directors. Similarly, companies without employee directors are significantly more profitable 
than firms with such directors. The sample average (median) ROA is 5.6% (5.1%), and the ROA for firms 
without employee-directors averages 5.9% (5.4%) versus average ratios of between 3.4% (2.3%) and 
3.8%  (2.6%)  for  companies  with  directors  elected  by  employees.  Companies  without  employee 
representation on boards also growth significantly more rapidly than do those with employee directors, 
with average (median) growth rates of 19.3% (8.8%) versus rates between 5.1% (3.7%) and 6.7% (4.0%). 
The overall average growth rate for all firm-year observations is 16.8% (7.7%), but companies without 
                                                 
2 The French state actually owns these stakes through the CDC, or Caisse des depôts et consignation, which is a 
state institutional investor similar to a modern sovereign wealth fund.   - 13 -
employee board representation grow significantly more rapidly than any category of firms with such 
representation.  
  There are generally no significant differences between firms with and without employee directors 
with respect to return volatility (STD), payout ratios (PAYOUT), and the fraction of women (WOMEN) 
on the corporate boards. The exceptions to this are that firms with directors elected by right (DEMP=1) 
have significantly higher volatility than firms with no employee representation, and the median fraction of 
women directors is higher in firms with directors elected by right and in firms with directors elected by 
employee-shareholders than in companies without employee directors—for whom the median fraction of 
women directors is zero. 
  On the other hand, firms with employee directors are significantly older than firms without such 
representation  and  have  significantly  larger  boards  that  meet  significantly  more  frequently  and  have 
significantly  more  standing  committees.  The  average  ages  of  firms  with  employee  directors 
(DEMPLOYEE=1), with directors elected by right (DEMP=1), and with directors elected by employee-
shareholders (DEMPSHARE=1) are, respectively, 79.2, 68.8, and 88.8 years versus 57.9 years for firms 
with no employee board representation and 62.2 years for the full sample of all companies. Medians ages 
show even greater differences, with a no-representation company median age of 39.0 years compared 
with medians of 60.0, 69.0, and 72.0 years for DEMP=1, DEMPLOYEE=1, and DEMPSHARE=1 firms. 
The average (median) size of corporate boards without employee representation is 9.9 (10.0) directors, 
significantly smaller than the 15.4 (15), 16.1 (16), and 15.0 (15) member boards of companies with any 
type of employee-directors, those with directors elected by right, and those with directors elected by 
employee-shareholders.  The boards of firms without employee directors meet an average (median) of 6.9 
(6) times per year and have an average of 1.79 (2) standing committees. Companies with employee-
directors meet on average 7.42 (7) times per year and have a mean 2.71 (3) standing committees, and the 
mean and median values are similar for firms with directors elected by right and for companies with 
directors  elected  by  employee-shareholders.  Thus,  companies  with  board  members  representing 
employees have significantly larger, more complex, and more active boards than do companies without 
employee representatives.  
  As noted above, French corporate law allows, but does not mandate that firms may select a two-
tiered board, with separate supervisory and management boards, as per the German model. Companies are 
also allowed, but not required, to combine the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
These  choices  allow  for  a  very  interesting  comparison  between  firms  that  do  and  do  not  select  a 
supervisory board and combine the positions of CEO and board Chair, and we find significant differences 
between firms with and without employee board representation for both variables. Companies without 
employee representation are, on average, three times more likely to have a two-tiered board than are firms   - 14 -
with employee directors, with 34.6% of the former having supervisory boards versus 11.1% in the latter. 
Conversely, companies with employee directors are far more likely to combine the positions of CEO and 
board Chair than are firms without employee representation, with 51.3% of the latter companies having 
combined CEO/Chair positions versus 75.4% for the former. Both of these findings reflect the greater 
likelihood that companies with employee directors will be privatized companies, where the state designed 
in corporate governance structures that mirror perceived global—or at least American--standard practice. 
Firms with employee and employee-shareholder directors on their boards have greater state ownership 
than their counterparts. However, family ownership is less massive in these firms. Results remain robust 
when we use voting rights (both in univariate and multivariate tests) rather than shareholdings. 
In  sum,  these  univariate  comparison  suggest  that,  compared  to  companies  without  employee 
board representation, firms with employee-directors are larger, older, less profitable, have more intangible 
and fewer tangible assets, have larger and more complex boards that meet more frequently, are less likely 
to have a two-tiered board structure, and are more likely to be headed by a manager with the combined 
duties of CEO and Board Chair. Furthermore, the univariate analyses reveal little difference in observed 
financial  policies  between  companies  with  directors  elected  by  employees  as  a  matter  of  right  and 
companies with directors elected by employee-shareholders. Naturally, univariate comparisons can only 
tell us so much, so we now employ regression analyses to examine the impact of employee directors on 
corporate valuation and financial policies.  
 
5.  Methodology and regression results 
 
Our  multivariate  analyses  consist  of  a  series  of  regressions,  with  which  we  examine  how 
employee representation impacts corporate valuation, payout policy, and board of director performance. 
We measure valuation using two ratios, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA), with Tobin’s Q defined as 
the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of assets minus the book value 
of  equity,  all  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets.  Payout  is  measured  variously  as  cash  dividend 
payments  divided  by  net  income  (PAYOUT),  cash  dividends  divided  by  sales  (DIV/SALES),  share 
repurchases divided by net income (REP/NETINC) and sales (REP/SALES), and the combined value of 
cash dividends and share repurchases divided by net income (CREP/NETINC) and sales (CREP/SALES). 
Board performance is measured as the annual frequency of board of director meetings, with the fewer 
meetings  required  being  considered  a  measure  of  superior  performance  [Vafeas  (1999)].  Finally,  we 
estimate the likelihood of directors being elected by employees (by right) and by employee-shareholders 
based on observable firm characteristics.    - 15 -
We employ three types of cross-sectional regressions: ordinary least squares, Logit (when the 
dependent variable is a dummy); and Tobit (when the dependent variable is censored) regressions. As 
discussed in Greene (2003), an OLS regression model is not suitable for a discrete-censored variable like 
MEETINGS as it provides biased and inconsistent estimations. For each of our regressions, we report the 
size of the sample (i.e. the number of non-missing observations in the sample) and the adjusted R² or the 
Pseudo R². Our tables present the coefficients and t-statistics and indicate coefficient significance levels at 
1%, 5% and 10%. Then, results are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) test.  
 
5.1.  The impact of employee board representation on firm value 
  Table 4 presents the results of estimating the impact of employee ownership on firm valuation 
and profitability. Columns 2-4 of Table 4 present estimations of Tobin’s Q, while columns 5-7 present 
estimations of ROA. Consistent with extant literature, both of these measures are significantly negatively 
related to firm size and financial leverage, suggesting that smaller and less indebted companies have 
higher  valuations  and  are  more  profitable.  Also  unsurprisingly,  Tobin’s  Q  is  significantly  positively 
related to growth rate and the level of capital investment spending divided by total assets, but ROA is not 
significantly related to either growth or capital spending. The level of tangible assets as a fraction of total 
assets is not significantly related to either Tobin’s Q or ROA.  
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
  Turning to the ownership structure and employee representation variables, we see that the fraction 
of directors elected by right by employees (PEMP) does not significantly impact either Tobin’s Q or 
ROA, but the fraction of directors elected by employee-shareholders (PEMPSHARE) is significantly 
positively related to both valuation measures. This is true whether PEMPSHARE is regressed on Tobin’s 
Q and ROA in isolation (columns 3 and 6) or along with a variable interacting PEMPSHARE with 
employee ownership (in columns 4 and 7). In the latter cases, the coefficient on PEMPSHARE*EO is 
significantly  negative  in  the  estimations  of  both  Tobin’s  Q  and  ROA.  Taken  together,  these  results 
suggest that low levels of employee-shareholder representation on corporate boards are value-enhancing, 
but this effect diminishes as employee ownership increases.  
  The separate effects of family, employee, and state ownership on firm value and profitability 
contrast sharply. Employee ownership (EO) is significantly negatively related to both Tobin’s Q and 
ROA in all estimations, suggesting that rising employee stock ownership reduces value, independent of 
whether this ownership is also reflected in board representation. We have already seen that when these 
occur simultaneously the effect is significantly negative.  Residual state ownership is always negatively 
related  to  Tobin’s  Q—significantly  so  in  one  of  the  three  regressions—and  is  always  significantly   - 16 -
negatively related to ROA at the 10% significance level, or higher. Family ownership is not significantly 
related to Tobin’s Q, but is significantly positively related to ROA at the 1% level in all three regressions.  
To  summarize  these  results,  we  find  that  Tobin’s  Q  is  significantly  higher  for  smaller,  less 
leveraged, more rapidly growing firms that spend more on capital investment and which have directors 
elected by employee-shareholders. Tobin’s Q is lower for companies with high levels of employee share 
ownership and where the state has a higher residual equity ownership. ROA is higher in smaller, less 
leveraged companies in which family ownership remains high, and where employee-shareholders elected 
one or more directors. Rising employee and state ownership both reduce ROA. Finally, the fact that the 
adjusted R
2 is 0.33 or 0.34 in all six regressions suggests that our estimation models are explaining a 
substantial fraction of the cross-sectional variation in valuation and profitability measures in this sample.  
 
5.2.  The impact of employee board representation on payout policy 
  Table 5 presents the results of estimating the impact of employee ownership on corporate payout 
policy. Columns 2-4 of Table 5’s Panel A present estimations of cash dividend payments as a percent of 
net income (PAYOUT) and columns 5-7 present similar findings for dividends as a percent of sales 
(DIV/SALES).  Using  an  analogous  format,  Panels  B  and  C  of  Table  5  present  estimations  of, 
respectively, share repurchases and combined dividends and share repurchases.  
**** Insert table 5 about here **** 
  Results for the two cash dividend estimations show both similarities and differences with existing 
empirical research. Consistent with prior research, we find that both PAYOUT and DIV/SALES are 
significantly positively related to profitability (ROA) and negatively related to firm growth. Additionally, 
PAYOUT is significantly (at the 10% level) negatively related to capital spending in two of the three 
regressions, while DIV/SALES is significantly positively related to leverage at the 1% level in all three 
regressions.  On  the  other  hand,  our  finding  of  a  consistently—and  for  DIV/SALES,  significantly--
negative  relationship  between  firm  size  and  dividend  payout  differs  dramatically  from  the  positive 
relationship between size and payout most other empirical studies report, and is driven solely by including 
financial firms in the analysis. When the model is re-estimated on a sample of firms excluding financial 
companies,  the typical positive relationship between size and payout is restored. The positive size-payout 
relationship is also re-established once we define “payout” more broadly to include share repurchases, as 
detailed below.  
  The  impact  of  increasing  board  representation  by  employee-directors  is  striking  and  highly 
informative. The fraction of directors elected by employees by right (PEMP) is significantly negatively 
related to both PAYOUT and DIV/SALES at the 1% level in all four regressions where it is employed. 
Conversely,  the  presence  of  directors  elected  by  employee-shareholders  (PEMPSHARE)  has  no   - 17 -
significant effect on either measure of dividend payout. These results suggest that directors who represent 
workers who are not also shareholders work to reduce the amount of cash distributed by the firm to 
outside  shareholders  whereas  directors  representing  employee-shareholders  act  in  the  interest  of  all 
shareholders and do not reduce payouts.  
  Employee share ownership (EO) has the same significantly negative impact on both measures of 
dividend payout that was observed for PEMP, and we interpret this result similarly—as resulting from a 
desire  on  the  part  of  employees  to  retain  cash  in  the  firm  at  the  expense  of  shareholders.  Family 
ownership is also significantly negatively related to both measures of dividend payout, perhaps because 
founding family members are likely to also be managers and thus able to enjoy the private benefits of 
control directly—without sharing corporate profits with outside shareholders in the form of dividends. 
Somewhat surprisingly, state ownership is not significantly related to either PAYOUT or DIV/SALES. 
  Panel B of Table 5 presents results for estimating payout as share repurchases divided by net 
income (REP/NETINC) and by sales (REP/SALES), with the former being presented in columns 2-5 and 
the  latter  in  columns  5-7.  Consistent  with  existing  literature  [see  Skinner  (2008)  and  von  Eije  and 
Megginson (2008)] both share repurchase measures are significantly positively related to firm size and 
profitability (ROA), and significantly negatively related to the market-to-book value ratio (MTB). As 
with cash dividends, share repurchases are significantly negatively related to the fraction of directors 
elected by workers as a right (PEMP) and to the level of employee stock ownership. State ownership is 
now consistently—and, in two of six cases, significantly--negatively associated with payout, defined as 
repurchases.  Once  again,  the  presence  of  directors  elected  by  employee-shareholders  does  not 
significantly impact share repurchases.  
  Finally, Panel C presents estimations where payout is defined as the combined level of cash 
dividend  payments  as  a  percent  of  net  income  (CREP/NETINC,  in  columns  2-4)  and  sales 
(CREP/SALES). Both combined payout measures are significantly positively related to profitability and 
negatively related to the fraction of directors elected by employees by right (PEMP) and to employee 
share ownership. Combined payout as a percent of sales (CREP/SALES) is significantly positively related 
to leverage and significantly negatively related to family ownership. Rather strangely, CREP/NETINC is 
significantly  positively related  to  firm  size,  as  in the  repurchase estimations, while  CREP/SALES is 
significantly negatively related to SIZE, as was the case for cash dividends.    
  Taken  together,  these  results  show  that  both  ownership  structure  and  board  representation 
materially and significantly influence corporate payout policies. The presence of directors elected by 
employees as a right (PEMP) has a consistent and generally significant negative impact on both cash 
dividend payments and share repurchases. The same is true for employee ownership, as distinct from 
representation.  This  is  consistent  with  employees  who  are  not  also  owners  acting  to  block  cash   - 18 -
distributions  from  firms  that  would  benefit  shareholders.  On  the  other  hand,  directors  representing 
employee-shareholders have no impact on corporate payout policies, and instead seem to have the same 
interests as directors representing outside shareholders.  
 
5.3.  The impact of employee board representation on board performance 
  We estimate the impact of employee representation on corporate board performance in two ways. 
First,  we  test  whether  worker  representation  on  the  board  leads  on  average  to  more  frequent  board 
meetings. Second, we estimate the likelihood that directors will be elected by employees as a right and by 
employee-shareholders based on observable firm characteristics.  
Table 6 presents the results of estimating average board meeting frequency, and many of the 
findings are fairly intuitive. For example, it is unsurprising that boards of companies that are growing 
more rapidly will meet significantly more frequently on average than will less complex boards of slower 
growing firms, or that boards of more profitable companies will meet significantly less frequently than 
boards of more financially troubled firms. Greater complexity in the task of overseeing a company and 
more rapid sales growth imply the need to assemble as a board more frequently to assess and adjust firm 
objectives, while the need to make such adjustments is less when the current corporate plan is working—
when profits are high.  
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
The  impact  of  employee  representation  on  board  meeting  frequency  is  once  more  highly 
informative in that it shows that board members elected by employees as a right (who are not necessarily 
also shareholders) are associated with significantly more frequent board meetings than are board members 
who represent shareholders, either employee-shareholders or outside shareholders. The coefficient on the 
continuous variable measuring the fraction of the board accounted for by workers (PEMP) is significantly 
positive. These results again suggest that simply giving employees the right to elect a fraction of the board 
of directors imposes unnecessary costs on the firm, in the form of more frequent board meetings, but that 
directors elected by workers who are also shareholders do not impose similar costs.    
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of estimating the fraction of a corporate board that will be 
elected by employees. Since the dependent variable is truncated at zero, Tobit regression is used. Column 
2 examines the fraction of the board represented by directors elected by workers by right (PEMP), while 
column 3 examines the fraction of the board represented by directors elected by employee-shareholders. 
Four  variables  significantly  influence  both types  of  employee  representation.  Board representation  is 
likely  to  be  higher  when  the  CEO  and  board  chair’s  position  are  combined  (CEO/CHAIR),  when 
employee share ownership (EO) is higher, when state ownership is higher (STATE), and when family 
ownership is lower (FAM). The rationale for the EO and STATE results are fairly obvious, since we   - 19 -
know that employee representation is common only in privatized companies and board representation is 
likely to be allocated to employees when their share holdings are sizeable (PEMP) and when employees 
have the votes to elect one of their own anyway (PEMPSHARE). Additionally, Tobin’s Q does not 
significantly predict either type of employee representation, and PEMPSHARE is not significantly related 
to any other variable.  
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
On the other hand, PEMP is significantly positively related to firm size (SIZE) and to the fraction 
of women directors on the corporate board, and negatively related to leverage. These results suggest that 
employee representation is a result of political and legal forces, especially the amount of stock retained in 
privatized  companies  by  the  state  and  employees’  own  share  ownership. Managing  families  are  less 
willing  to  grant  employees  representation,  whereas  firms  with  a  very  powerful  managing  director 
(CEO/CHAIR)  are  more  willing  to  allow  workers  to  be  represented  on  the  board.  Though  political 
influences matter for both types of representation, the election of directors representing employees who 
are not also shareholders seems to be driven by more explicitly political factors—especially the presence 
of larger fractions of women directors—and is more likely in the largest firms, which naturally tend to be 
privatized companies. There is also some evidence that firms employ leverage in order to reduce the size 
of their outstanding equity capital and thus reduce the need to grant director positions to employees who 
are not also shareholders. 
 
6.  Robustness checks and discussion  
 
6.1.  Testing for endogeneity in financial policy choice   
   While the univariate and regression results presented above are suggestive and present a clear 
message that board representation granted to employees as a matter of right tends to be value-reducing, 
we must subject these findings to robustness checks before accepting them as fully valid. In particular, we 
must check for endogeneity in the choice of financial policies, particularly payout policy. We do this by 
employing two-stage least squares to first compute a predicted level of employee representation based on 
observable firm and ownership structure characteristics, and then using that predicted measure in tests of 
dividend payout and share repurchases. This explicitly allows for the possibility that some factor other 
than the presence of employee directors on corporate boards—in particular, the fact that a company had 
once been state-owned—might actually be driving valuation results and corporate payout policies.  
Table 8 presents the endogeneity-adjusted results of estimating the impact of employee ownership 
on corporate payout policy. As before, columns 2-4 of Table 8’s Panel A present estimations of cash 
dividend payments as a percent of net income (PAYOUT) and columns 5-7 present similar findings for   - 20 -
dividends as a percent of sales (DIV/SALES), firm valuation, and profitability. Panels B and C of Table 8 
present  analogous  estimations  of,  respectively,  share  repurchases  and  combined  dividends  and  share 
repurchases.  
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
  Results for the two cash dividend estimations, adjusted for endogeneity, are generally similar to 
the original unadjusted findings. Additionally, while there are fewer significant relationships overall, the 
adjusted R
2 values are virtually identical to those in the unadjusted regressions of Table 5. Both PAYOUT 
and DIV/SALES are always significantly negatively related to firm growth, and are positively related to 
profitability (ROA) when both the percent of directors elected by employees as a right (PEMP) and the 
percent  of  directors  elected  by  employee-shareholders  (PEMPSHARE)  are  included  simultaneously. 
When only PEMP is included, the relationship between size and dividend PAYOUT and DIV/SALES is 
insignificant,  while  there  is  a  significant  negative  relationship  SIZE  and  DIV/SALES  when  only 
PEMPSHARE  is  included.  PAYOUT  is  again  significantly  negatively  related  to  capital  spending 
(CAPEX/ASSETS) in two of the three regressions, now at the 5% significance level, while the market-to-
book (MTB) ratio is now significantly positively related to DIV/SALES at the 1% level. Adjusting for 
endogeneity materially weakens the positive relationship between LEVERAGE and DIV/SALES, which 
is now significant (at the 10% level) only once.  
  The impact of increasing board representation by employee-directors changes subtly once we 
adjust for endogeneity. As before, the fraction of directors elected by employees by right (PEMP) is 
significantly  negatively  related  to  both  PAYOUT  and  DIV/SALES  (at  the  1%  level)  in  all  four 
regressions where it is employed. However, the coefficients on the four estimations of PEMPSHARE, the 
fractional representation of directors elected by employee-shareholders, are much larger than before and 
the relationship between PEMPSHARE and DIV/SALES is now significantly positive (at the 1% level) in 
the estimation where both employee representation measures are included. These results suggest that 
directors  who  represent  workers  who  are  not  also  shareholders  work  to  reduce  the  amount  of  cash 
distributed by the firm to outside shareholders, whereas directors representing employee-shareholders 
actually increase payouts.  
  Both  employee  share  ownership  (EO)  and  family  ownership  (FAM)  have  the  same  negative 
impact  on  PAYOUT  and  DIV/SHARE  documented  previously,  but  coefficient  size  and  significance 
levels are reduced after adjusting for endogeneity. Both measures are now significant in only three of six 
estimations,  rather  than  consistently  so  as  before.  Interestingly,  state  ownership  (STATE)  becomes 
significantly positively related to both PAYOUT and DIV/SALES in all four regressions where PEMP is 
also an explanatory variable, suggesting that state ownership offsets the payout-reducing influence of   - 21 -
directors  elected  as  a  right  by  employees.  STATE  has  the  opposite  impact  on  DIV/SALES  when 
representation by employee-shareholders (PEMPSHARE) is high. 
  Panel  B  of  Table  8  presents  the  endogeneity-adjusted  results  of  estimating  payout  as  share 
repurchases divided by net income (REP/NETINC) and by sales (REP/SALES), with the former being 
presented in columns 2-5 and the latter in columns 5-7. The financial variables generally have the same 
coefficient signs and significance levels observed before, with both share repurchase measures being 
significantly positively related to firm size and profitability (ROA), and significantly negatively related to 
the  market-to-book  value  ratio  (MTB).  Now,  however,  repurchases  are  always  negatively  related  to 
capital investment spending, and significantly so in five of the six regressions. Share repurchases are still 
negatively  related  to  the fraction  of  directors  elected  by  workers  as  a  right  (PEMP),  to  the level  of 
employee stock ownership (EO), and to the level of state ownership (STATE). Though the coefficients on 
these variables are now much larger than in the previous regressions (unadjusted for endogeneity), they 
are less frequently significant. As with cash dividends, adjusting for endogeneity makes the relationship 
between the fraction of directors elected by employee-shareholders and share repurchases significantly 
positive in three of the four regressions where PEMPSHARE is included. Employee shareholders seem to 
promote share repurchases by companies on whose boards they are represented. 
  Finally, Panel C presents estimations where payout is defined as the combined level of cash 
dividend  payments  as  a  percent  of  net  income  (CREP/NETINC,  in  columns  2-4)  and  sales 
(CREP/SALES). Most relationships are similar to those observed in the earlier regressions that did not 
adjust for endogeneity, though fewer are significant and the overall explanatory power of the regressions 
is somewhat reduced. Combined payout is always positively related to size, profitability, and leverage, 
though only significantly so twice with ROA and once with LEVERAGE, when PEMP is also included in 
the regressions. Employee ownership (EO) is always negatively related to payout, significantly so in four 
of six regressions, while there is less consistency in the relationship between payout and family and state 
ownership (FAM, STATE). The coefficients on STATE are generally negative, and significantly so in 
two regressions, but the FAM coefficient is positive three times and negative three times, with one of 
each sign being significant. Most importantly, the fraction of a firm’s board represented by directors 
elected by right by employees (PEMP) is always negatively related to the combined payout ratios, and 
significant in two of four regressions, while the fraction of directors elected by employee-shareholders 
(PEMPSHARE) is always positively related to the combined payout ratio, and significantly so in three of 
four regressions.   
These endogeneity-adjusted results support the robustness of our previous findings. The presence 
of directors elected by employees as a right (PEMP) has a consistent and generally significant negative 
impact on both cash dividend payments and share repurchases. Employee ownership, as distinct from   - 22 -
representation,  similarly  reduces  payout,  supporting  the  conclusion  that  employees  who  are  not  also 
owners act to block cash distributions from firms that would benefit shareholders. In contrast to prior 
findings, however, adjusting for endogeneity reveals that directors representing employee-shareholders 
significantly increase cash distributions by companies on whose boards they sit, which strengthens the 
conclusion that employee-shareholders have interests that are very much consistent with those of other 
shareholders.  
 
6.2.   Robustness checks and extensions 
In this section, we present results of various tests of the impact of employee representation on 
firm value using alternative measures of employee participation as well as several different measures of 
performance. In particular, we examine whether workers’ affiliation with a radical left-wing union affects 
the objectives of their elected board representatives, and in turn affects firm valuation, payout policy,   
 
6.2.1.  Staff costs 
As discussed in Allen and Gale (2002), it may be in the interest of both shareholders and workers 
to  cut  dividends in  order to  maintain  wages  and  employment.  We  examine the impact  of employee 
representation on staff costs, where STAFFCOST is a continuous variable representing wages paid to 
employees of the company divided by the number of employees. It includes all employee benefits, such as 
health insurance and contributions to pension plans. This variable is expected to be higher for knowledge-
intensive firms. As we control for industry, size, growth, capital expenditure and all the variables included 
in regressions of Table 4, we may also measure a high wage policy. In unreported results, we observe a 
positive  and  significant  impact  of  employee  board  representation,  both  elected  and  shareholder 
employees, on staff costs. This is consistent with previous findings reported in Table 4, which show 
performance also increases with shareholder employee directors, implying that shareholders may actually 
benefit from a high wage policy. 
 
6.2.2.  Union affiliation of employees on the board 
Nearly 94% elected employee directors are union representatives, whereas shareholder employee 
directors  are  mainly  non-affiliated.  French  industrial  relations  differ  from  those  in  other  developed 
countries in that the relationship between labour and capital is more adversarial and ideologically charged 
than  elsewhere,  so  we  investigate  the  impact  of  radical  union  affiliation  of  employee  directors  on 
corporate valuation and payout policies.
3 Data on union affiliation of employee-directors comes from 
                                                 
3 See Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Ruysseveldt and Visser (1996).   - 23 -
registration documents, Factiva and LexisNexis databases, or from direct contacts with trade unions or 
corporate investor relations centers. 
Over the period 1998 to 2005, 82% of the employee-directors elected by right are affiliated to one 
of the five confederations  (unions) recognized by the French state as negotiating partners in 1966 (CGT, 
FO, CFDT, CFTC and CFE-CGC), while 11% are affiliated with other French or foreign confederations 
and 7% are non-affiliated. We split union affiliations into two groups based on radical ideology--the 
communist/class struggle unions and others. We replicate the Table 4, 5 and 6 regressions including 
alternatively  the  fraction of  employees  on  the  board  belonging  to  the  more  left-oriented  unions,  the 
fraction  of  employees  belonging  to  other  unions,  and  both  variables.  We  find  that  results  remain 
qualitatively similar for payout policy. Both groups of union representatives have a negative impact on 
payouts. However, we find that increasing the number of left-oriented employee directors on the board 
increases staff costs, all else equal, but has no impact on Tobin’s Q, and even has a positive impact on 
ROA. On the other hand, more consensual union representatives lead to an increase in the number of 
board meetings, which is not the case for more left-oriented representatives. These results favor left wing 
union directors getting better salaries for employees working harder, whereas more consensual union 
directors enhance monitoring by increasing the number of meetings.  
 
6.2.3.  State ownership versus privatization variables 
Most of the firms that have elected employees on the board are privatized firms. Some of them 
were first privatized more than 20 years ago, some more recently, and the French Sate still owns shares in 
most of them. The state ownership decreases over time after privatization. Therefore state ownership and 
privatization variables (number of years since privatization, period of privatization, government under 
which privatization took place) are highly correlated. In tables 4 to 8, we include state ownership as an 
independent variable rather than a privatization variable, because it is more homogeneous relative to other 
shareholders  (family,  employee  ownership).  If  we  include  privatization  variables  instead  of  state 
ownership, the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
6.2.4.  Board characteristics 
In our sample, the correlation between firm size and the number of directors on the board is 
0.709.  Introducing  them  together  in  the  regressions  would  lead  to  potential  spurious  relations.  We 
replicate tables 4 to 8 analyses including board size instead of firm size. We find similar qualitative and 
statistical results to those reported in the tables. We also perform variations of regressions excluding two-
tier board firms from our sample. In each specification, the signs and significance of the coefficients of 
independent variables are essentially unchanged. Next, we examine if employee directors sit on board   - 24 -
committees. The number of employees in committees increases over time, but is still small. In 2005, there 
were 24  employee  directors  on  committees,  among  which 10 sit  on  audit  committees and 12 sit  on 
strategic committees.  
 
6.2.5.  Excluding finance firms 
Our sample includes finance firms, as in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2008). Although the sample size is about 13% smaller, our results in tables 4 to 8 are 
virtually unchanged when we drop these firms. 
 
6.3.  Alternative Control Variables and Specification. 
Finally, we replicate tables 4 to 8 analyses with different independent variables. To measure size, 
we alternatively use log of sales instead of log of book value of total assets. To measure growth, we use 
the percentage change in net sales for one, two, three and five years. To increase the sample size, we run 
more  parsimonious  regressions  by  excluding  capital  expenditure,  using  non-winsored  dependent 
variables, and keeping negative net income firms in the sample. The results remain qualitatively the same. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
This  study  examines  the  impact  of  mandated  employee  board  representation  on  corporate 
valuation and performance. French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be 
allowed to elect directors for two reasons, by right of employment in formerly state-owned companies and 
when their shareholdings exceed three percent. These two rights have engendered substantial employee 
representation  on  the  boards  of  over  one-quarter  of  the  largest  French  companies,  and  especially  in 
privatized companies that are the country’s largest and most valuable. This provides a unique institutional 
setting in which to test whether and how employee representation impacts firm value, profitability, payout 
policies (cash dividends and repurchases), and board organization, complexity, and performance. We 
generate predictions based on received theory and test these predictions using a comprehensive sample of 
firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2005.  
We find that, on balance, employee representation on corporate boards seems to be at least value-
neutral, and may actually increase firm valuation and profitability when employee-shareholders elect 
company directors. The presence of directors elected by employee shareholders unambiguously increases 
firm  valuation  and  profitability,  but  does  not  significantly  impact  corporate  payout  policy  or  board 
organization and performance. The presence of directors elected by employees by right significantly   - 25 -
reduces payout ratios, increases overall staff costs, and increases board size, complexity, and meeting 
frequency—but does not significantly impact firm value or profitability.  
Since many corporate policies, especially those related to payout, may result endogenously rather 
than as a direct result of employee representation on corporate boards, we perform numerous robustness 
checks that verify the negative causal link between representation of employees by right and all types of 
corporate  payouts.  Additional  robustness  tests  payouts  indicate  that  when  the  firm’s  employees  are 
represented by the most radical left-wing unions (CGT, FO, CFDT, CFTC, or CFE-CGC) payout is 
significantly reduced, but the impact on corporate valuation is unaffected and profitability is significantly 
increased, probably due to a more structured and demanding work environment when these unions are 
involved in corporate governance and industrial relations.    - 26 -
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Figure 1 - Board Structure Trends: 1998-2005 
The sample includes 156 unique firms covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005. Panel A reports the 
percent  of  firms  with  employee  directors  (directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-shareholders  or  from 
employees).  Panel  B  reports  the  percent  of  employee  directors  on  board  (directors  elected  from  among  the 
employee-shareholders or from the employees). DEMPLOYEES is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has 
employee directors on the board, and zero otherwise. DEMP is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has 
directors elected from among the employees on the board, and zero otherwise. DEMPSHARE is dummy variable 
equal  to  one  if  the  firm  has  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-shareholders  on  the  board,  and  zero 
otherwise. PEMPLOYEES is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. 
PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of 
directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. 
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Table 1 - Description of firm, ownership structure, and board variables 
This table explains the construction of the firm, ownership and board variables used in our regressions. 
 
Firm Variables   
SIZE  Book value of total assets, euro millions. Source: Worldscope. 
LSIZE  Natural log of the book value of total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
LEVERAGE  Leverage measured as total debt over total assets. Source: Proxy. 
TANGIBLE  Ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Source: Proxy. 
CAPEX  Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Source: Proxy. 
ROA  Return on Assets measured as operating income over total assets. Source: Proxy. 
QTOBIN  Tobin’s Q defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book 
value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. 
Source: Proxy. 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. Source: 
Proxy. 
GROWTH  Growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales for two years. Source: Proxy. 
PAYOUT  Dividend payout ratio constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and 
preferred shareholders to net income. Source: Proxy. 
DIV/SALES  Ratio  of  total  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred  shareholders  to  net  sales. 
Source: Proxy. 
REP/NETINC  Ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income. Source: Proxy. 
REP/SALES  Ratio of share repurchase amounts to net sales. Source: Proxy. 
CREP/NETINC  Ratio  of  total  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred  shareholders  plus  share 
repurchase amounts to net income. Source: Proxy. 
CREP/SALES  Ratio  of  total  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred  shareholders  plus  share 
repurchase amounts to net sales. Source: Proxy. 
AGE  Firm age, in years. Source: Proxy. 
INDUSTRY  Primary one-digit SIC code dummies. Source: Thomson One Banker, Diane. 
YEAR  Year dummies. Source: Proxy. 
Ownership Variables   
EO  Ratio  of  the  number  of  shares  of  all  classes  held  by  the  employees  to  total  shares 
outstanding. Source: Registration documents. 
FAMILY  Ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. 
Source: Registration documents. 
STATE  Ratio  of  the  number  of  shares  of  all  classes  held  by  the  French  state  to  total  shares 
outstanding. Source: Registration documents. 
Board Variables  
 
CEO/CHAIR  Dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if  the  CEO  is  also  the  chairman  of  the  board,  and  zero 
otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
SUPERVISORY  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual structure (Conseil de surveillance and 
Directoire), and zero if the firm has a unique board of directors (Conseil d'administration). 
Source: Registration documents. 
BOARDSIZE  Number of directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
WOMEN  Fraction of women directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
MEETINGS  Annual number of board meetings (excludes actions by written consent of the directors and 
telephonic meetings of the board). Source: Registration documents. 
COMMITTEES  Total number of standing board committees. Source: Registration documents. 
DSHIPS  Average  number  of  directorships  in  listed  companies  which  is  the  total  number  of 
directorship  posts  held  by  directors  in  listed  companies  divided  by  the  total  number  of 
directors. Source: Registration documents.   - 31 -
DEMPLOYEES  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has employee directors on the board, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
DEMP  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has directors elected from among the employees on 
the board, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
DEMPSHARE  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has directors elected from among the employee-
shareholders on the board, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
PEMPLOYEES  Fraction of employee directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
PEMP  Fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. Source: Registration 
documents. 
PEMPSHARE  Fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. Source: 
Registration documents. 
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Table 2. Composition of the sample by industry (one-digit SIC code) 
This table reports the composition of the sample by industry - one-digit SIC code. The sample is drawn from the SBF 
120 Index and includes 156 firms covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005.  
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Table 3 (Panel A). Descriptive statistics of variables over the period 1998-2005 
This table presents summary statistics on key firm, ownership and board variables. The sample is drawn from the SBF 120 Index and 
includes  156  firms  covering  1,025  firm-years  over  the  period  1998-2005.  SIZE  is  the  book  value  of  total  assets  in  euro  millions. 
LEVERAGE is measured as total debt over total assets. TANGIBLE is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales for two 
years. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. ROA is measured as operating income over total assets. QTOBIN is defined 
as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the 
book value of assets. MTB is ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, 
all divided by the book value of total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales for two years. 
PAYOUT is constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to earnings after taxes but before 
extraordinary items. DIV/SALES is the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net sales. REP/NETINC is the 
ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income. REP/SALES is the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net sales. CREP/NETINC is the 
ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net income. CREP/SALES is the ratio 
of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net sales. AGE is the firm age in years. EO 
is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares 
of all classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the 
employees to total shares outstanding. CEO/CHAIR is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 
zero otherwise. SUPERVISORY is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual structure (Conseil de surveillance and Directoire), 
and zero if the firm has a unique board of directors (Conseil d’administration). BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. 
WOMEN is the fraction of women on the board. MEETINGS is the annual number of board meetings (excludes actions by written consent 
of the directors and telephonic meetings of the board). COMMITTEES is the total number of standing board committees. DSHIPS is the 
average number of directorships in listed companies which is the total number of directorship posts held by directors in listed companies 
divided by the total number of directors. PEMPLOYEES is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the 
board. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected 
from among the employee-shareholders on the board. 
 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  Std. Dev. 
SIZE  1023  32,917.09  3201.67  5.63  1,260,000.00  113,000.00 
LEVERAGE  1023  0.26  0.26  0.00  1.19  0.16 
TANGIBLE  1020  0.22  0.15  0.00  0.98  0.22 
CAPEX  979  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.50  0.05 
ROA  1023  0.06  0.05  -0.70  0.39  0.08 
QTOBIN  1016  1.85  1.33  0.65  28.92  1.90 
MTB  1016  2.56  1.58  -0.86  44.12  3.48 
GROWTH  1019  0.17  0.08  -0.84  10.18  0.50 
PAYOUT  1023  0.36  0.29  -5.99  37.50  1.40 
DIV/SALES  1017  0.03  0.01  0.00  1.92  0.08 
REP/NETINC  1023  0.05  0.00  -8.18  6.98  0.47 
REP/SALES  1023  0.01  0.00  -0.17  0.91  0.05 
CREP/NETINC  1017  0.39  0.26  -8.18  35.60  1.72 
CREP/SALES  1017  0.03  0.01  -0.17  1.92  0.10 
AGE  1025  62.12  42.00  2.00  313.00  53.38 
EO  1024  2.08  0.83  0.00  32.83  3.83 
FAM  1024  16.55  0.00  0.00  86.45  22.34 
STATE  1024  4.38  0.00  0.00  93.37  13.6 
CEO/CHAIR  1025  0.56  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.50 
SUPERVISORY  1025  0.31  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.46 
BOARDSIZE  1025  11.00  11.00  3.00  24.00  4.32 
WOMEN  1025  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.67  0.11 
MEETINGS  816  7.00  6.00  1.00  30.00  3.17 
COMMITTEES  1025  1.98  2.00  0.00  4.00  1.25 
DSHIPS  870  1.18  1.00  0.00  5.17  0.95 
PEMPLOYEES  1025  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.41  0.08 
PEMP  1025  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.35  0.06 
PEMPSHARE  1025  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.27  0.04   - 34 -
 Table 3 (Panel B). Descriptive statistics of variables over the period 1998-2005: Comparisons between groups 
 
Variables 
Firms with directors 
elected from among 
the employees [a] 
Firms without 
directors elected 










Firms with directors 
















[b']  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
SIZE  144,000.00  25,020.51  17,351.33  2,574.60  12.6040***  11.2883***  51,556.05  19,934.40  30,322.58  2,586.44  1.9669**  10.0611*** 
LEVERAGE  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.26  -0.8153  -0.7131  0.25  0.23  0.26  0.26  -0.5103  -0.8934 
TANGIBLE  0.16  0.09  0.23  0.15  -3.4306***  -4.4878***  0.19  0.11  0.22  0.15  -1.7636*  -2.2935** 
CAPEX  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.04  -3.1158***  -4.1633***  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  -1.4978  0.0886 
ROA  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.05  -3.2893***  -5.5035***  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.05  -2.8690***  -4.6878*** 
QTOBIN  1.40  1.07  1.91  1.38  -2.8026***  -6.2552***  1.33  1.17  1.92  1.36  -3.2424***  -4.8898*** 
MTB  1.96  1.14  2.64  1.62  -2.0428**  -5.3696***  1.69  1.39  2.68  1.61  -3.0046***  -3.5446*** 
GROWTH  0.05  0.03  0.18  0.08  -2.8249***  -4.4007***  0.06  0.04  0.18  0.08  -2.5069**  -3.7978*** 
PAYOUT  0.30  0.33  0.37  0.29  -0.5394  0.9522  0.26  0.32  0.37  0.29  -0.8455  0.2963 
DIV/SALES  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  -1.1392  1.5768  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  -1.7809*  -1.2638 
REP/NETINC  0.03  0.00  0.05  0.00  -0.4897  -0.5142  0.08  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.7579  1.8689* 
REP/SALES  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  -1.2278  -0.7725  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.8806  -1.4417 
CREP/NETINC  0.29  0.28  0.40  0.26  -0.6705  0.2858  0.32  0.29  0.40  0.25  -0.4508  0.8767 
CREP/SALES  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.01  -1.5565  1.4290  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.01  -1.9063*  -0.7783 
AGE  68.44  59.00  61.23  41.00  1.4202  2.4832**  88.40  72.00  58.43  39.00  6.0035***  5.3074*** 
EO  3.76  3.37  1.85  0.53  5.3125***  11.7009***  5.87  4.30  1.55  0.52  12.7500***  13.7425*** 
FAM  0.00  0.00  18.88  6.58  -9.2421***  -9.9905***  1.47  0.00  18.67  4.67  -8.3603***  -8.3614*** 
STATE  17.05  2.52  2.60  0.00  11.9060***  7.3969***  15.00  3.05  2.89  0.00  9.7862***  6.5338*** 
CEO/CHAIR  0.79  1.00  0.53  1.00  5.7259***  4.8481***  0.76  1.00  0.53  1.00  4.9279***  4.1893*** 
SUPERVISORY  0.06  0.00  0.34  0.00  -6.6747***  -5.2239***  0.13  0.00  0.33  0.00  -4.7311***  -3.7417*** 
BOARDSIZE  16.09  16.00  10.29  10.00  15.7044***  13.9388***  15.02  15.00  10.44  10.00  11.8962***  11.5208*** 
WOMEN  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.3516  2.9397***  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.00  -0.5122  1.7373* 
MEETINGS  7.76  7.00  6.86  6.00  2.8888***  3.6902***  7.06  7.00  6.98  6.00  0.2384  2.0094** 
COMMITTEES  2.82  3.00  1.86  2.00  8.3215***  8.2291***  2.63  3.00  1.89  2.00  6.4292***  6.1297*** 
DSHIPS  1.68  1.44  1.12  0.92  5.7546***  4.9730***  1.40  1.33  1.15  0.91  2.5801***  3.6206*** 
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Table 4 - Employee directors and firm performance 
The table presents results from regressing the Tobin’s Q (QTOBIN) defined as the market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal year plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets and the 
Return on Assets (ROA) constructed as a ratio of operating income to total assets on various firm, ownership and board 
characteristics. We estimate Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets via Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The sample includes 
156 firms listed on the SBF 120 Index, covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005. As in La Porta et al. (2000) 
and Faccio et al. (2001), firms with negative net income, negative cash flow and firms whose dividends exceed sales are 
excluded. We cap QTOBIN and ROA variables at the 99
th percentile to reduce the weight of extreme values. LSIZE is the 
natural log of the book value of total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales for 
two years. LEVERAGE is the leverage of the firm measured as total debt over total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. TANGIBLE is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. PEMP is the fraction of directors 
elected  from  among  the  employees  on  the  board.  PEMPSHARE  is  the  fraction  of  directors  elected  from  among  the 
employee-shareholders on the board. EO is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total 
shares outstanding. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. 
STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. Industry 
dummies and year dummies are included. The table presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 
1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * 
indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables  QTOBIN  QTOBIN  QTOBIN  ROA  ROA  ROA 
LSIZE  -0.0924***  -0.0901***  -0.0955***  -0.0086***  -0.0084***  -0.0086*** 
  (-3.843)  (-4.003)  (-4.199)  (-7.046)  (-6.989)  (-7.196) 
GROWTH  0.3506**  0.3490**  0.3625**  -0.0003  -0.0004  0.0001 
  (2.181)  (2.170)  (2.221)  (-0.052)  (-0.065)  (0.017) 
LEVERAGE  -2.6287***  -2.6349***  -2.6862***  -0.1009***  -0.1013***  -0.104*** 
  (-8.471)  (-8.500)  (-8.644)  (-7.386)  (-7.434)  (-7.568) 
TANGIBLE  -0.2724  -0.3025*  -0.2492  0.0088  0.0058  0.0083 
  (-1.498)  (-1.687)  (-1.397)  (0.937)  (0.636)  (0.909) 
CAPEX  1.8567**  1.8822**  1.8724**  0.0498  0.0542  0.0523 
  (2.241)  (2.302)  (2.291)  (1.362)  (1.472)  (1.431) 
PEMP  0.2825      0.0367     
  (0.442)      (1.333)     
PEMPSHARE    1.8599**  5.0365***    0.1178**  0.2690*** 
    (2.432)  (4.414)    (2.547)  (3.273) 
PEMPSHARE * EO      -0.3387***      -0.0158*** 
      (-3.566)      (-2.732) 
FAM  0.0022  0.0024  0.0028  0.0002**  0.0002**  0.0002** 
  (1.107)  (1.202)  (1.369)  (2.190)  (2.315)  (2.480) 
EO  -0.0259***  -0.0343***  -0.0239***  -0.0015***  -0.0019***  -0.0015*** 
  (-3.927)  (-4.242)  (-3.183)  (-4.272)  (-4.836)  (-3.777) 
STATE  -0.0036  -0.0033  -0.0041*  -0.0003**  -0.0003*  -0.0003** 
  (-1.133)  (-1.302)  (-1.652)  (-2.045)  (-1.874)  (-2.152) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  3.7290***  3.6953***  3.7425***  0.2255***  0.2221***  0.2237*** 
  (9.972)  (10.362)  (10.435)  (11.535)  (11.535)  (11.674) 
R²  0.34  0.34  0.35  0.35  0.36  0.36 
Adjusted R²  0.32  0.32  0.33  0.34  0.34  0.34 
N  810  810  810  811  811  811   - 36 -
Table 5 - Employee directors and dividend policy 
The table presents results from regressing the dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT) constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends 
paid to common and preferred shareholders to net income, the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred 
shareholders to net sales (DIV/SALES), the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income (REP/NETINC), the ratio of 
share repurchase amounts to net sales (REP/SALES), the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders 
and  share  repurchase  amounts  to  net  income  (CREP/NETINC)  and  the  ratio  of  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and 
preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net sales (CREP/SALES) on various firm, ownership and board 
characteristics. We estimate these variables via Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The sample includes 156 firms listed 
on the SBF 120 Index, covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005. As in La Porta et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. 
(2001), firms with negative net income, negative cash flow and firms whose dividends exceed sales are excluded. We cap 
all dependent variables at the 99
th percentile to reduce the weight of extreme values. LSIZE is the natural log of the book 
value of total assets. ROA is Return on Assets measured as operating income over total assets. LEVERAGE is the leverage 
of the firm measured as total debt over total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales 
for two years. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. MTB is the lagged Market-to-Book ratio measured 
as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book 
value of total assets. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is 
the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. EO is the ratio of the number of 
shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all 
classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the 
employees to total shares outstanding. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The table presents the coefficients 
and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing 
observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables  PAYOUT  PAYOUT  PAYOUT  DIV/SALES  DIV/SALES  DIV/SALES 
LSIZE  0.0041  0.0000  0.0042  -0.0025***  -0.0031***  -0.0025*** 
  (0.536)  (-0.001)  (0.550)  (-2.655)  (-3.182)  (-2.664) 
ROA  0.2124  0.2173  0.2214  0.0962***  0.0954***  0.0956*** 
  (1.072)  (1.094)  (1.109)  (3.286)  (3.234)  (3.238) 
LEVERAGE  0.0063  0.0234  0.0072  0.0261**  0.0284***  0.0260** 
  (0.076)  (0.284)  (0.087)  (2.469)  (2.647)  (2.461) 
CAPEX  -0.3934**  -0.3866**  -0.3926**  -0.0052  -0.0051  -0.0053 
  (-2.041)  (-1.990)  (-2.034)  (-0.194)  (-0.188)  (-0.197) 
GROWTH  -0.1274***  -0.1248***  -0.1277***  -0.0065  -0.0061  -0.0065 
  (-3.447)  (-3.399)  (-3.446)  (-1.583)  (-1.516)  (-1.582) 
MTB  0.0016  0.0012  0.0015  0.0003  0.0002  0.0003 
  (0.557)  (0.419)  (0.536)  (0.688)  (0.598)  (0.699) 
PEMP  -0.5027***    -0.5100***  -0.0744***    -0.0738*** 
  (-2.630)    (-2.635)  (-3.776)    (-3.734) 
PEMPSHARE    -0.0785  -0.1379    0.0190  0.0109 
    (-0.363)  (-0.653)    (0.913)  (0.572) 
STATE  0.0010  -0.0002  0.0010  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.913)  (-0.235)  (0.953)  (1.254)  (-0.636)  (1.208) 
FAM  -0.0014***  -0.0014***  -0.0015***  -0.0002***  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
  (-2.916)  (-2.913)  (-2.930)  (-3.539)  (-3.435)  (-3.485) 
EO  -0.0064***  -0.0070***  -0.0058***  -0.0011***  -0.0013***  -0.0012*** 
  (-3.456)  (-2.991)  (-2.702)  (-5.426)  (-4.577)  (-4.654) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.2109*  0.2655**  0.2090*  0.0283**  0.0363***  0.0285** 
  (1.729)  (2.207)  (1.712)  (2.186)  (2.711)  (2.196) 
R²  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.30  0.29  0.30 
Adjusted R²  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.28  0.26  0.27 
N  812  812  812  812  812  812   - 37 -
Table 5 - Continued 
 
Variables  REP/NETINC REP/NETINC  REP/NETINC  REP/SALES  REP/SALES  REP/SALES 
LSIZE  0.0187***  0.017***  0.0187***  0.0010**  0.0009**  0.0010** 
  (3.348)  (3.153)  (3.342)  (2.307)  (2.066)  (2.293) 
ROA  0.3477*  0.3442*  0.3458*  0.0259**  0.0253**  0.0254** 
  (1.934)  (1.888)  (1.901)  (2.393)  (2.309)  (2.320) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0050  0.0013  -0.0052  0.0033  0.0036  0.0032 
  (-0.054)  (0.014)  (-0.056)  (0.623)  (0.679)  (0.614) 
CAPEX  -0.0630  -0.0607  -0.0632  -0.0082  -0.0081  -0.0082 
  (-0.619)  (-0.596)  (-0.621)  (-1.289)  (-1.275)  (-1.294) 
GROWTH  0.0337  0.0347*  0.0337  0.0023  0.0023  0.0023 
  (1.627)  (1.671)  (1.625)  (0.837)  (0.859)  (0.839) 
MTB  -0.0016  -0.0017  -0.0016  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002 
  (-0.565)  (-0.601)  (-0.559)  (-1.230)  (-1.243)  (-1.206) 
PEMP  -0.1988**    -0.1973**  -0.0113*    -0.0110* 
  (-2.045)    (-1.996)  (-1.699)    (-1.645) 
PEMPSHARE    0.0516  0.0287    0.0081  0.0069 
    (0.409)  (0.222)    (0.902)  (0.774) 
STATE  -0.0004  -0.0009***  -0.0004  0.0000*  -0.0001***  0.0000* 
  (-0.970)  (-2.660)  (-0.976)  (-1.676)  (-3.582)  (-1.741) 
FAM  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.762)  (0.775)  (0.765)  (0.476)  (0.519)  (0.506) 
EO  -0.0007  -0.0013  -0.0008  -0.0001  -0.0002**  -0.0001* 
  (-0.658)  (-1.120)  (-0.698)  (-1.432)  (-2.095)  (-1.896) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.4613*  -0.4395*  -0.4609*  -0.0159**  -0.0146*  -0.0158** 
  (-1.901)  (-1.808)  (-1.900)  (-2.013)  (-1.834)  (-2.001) 
R²  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.07 
Adjusted R²  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04 
N  810  810  810  813  813  813 
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Table 5 - Continued 
 
Variables  CREP/NETINC CREP/NETINC CREP/NETINC CREP/SALES  CREP/SALES  CREP/SALES 
LSIZE  0.0459***  0.0379***  0.0458***  -0.0030**  -0.0038***  -0.0030** 
  (4.087)  (3.510)  (4.082)  (-2.348)  (-2.866)  (-2.365) 
ROA  -0.1156  -0.1243  -0.1184  0.1878***  0.1856***  0.1859*** 
  (-0.412)  (-0.436)  (-0.416)  (3.711)  (3.598)  (3.640) 
LEVERAGE  -0.2088  -0.1773  -0.2091  0.0359**  0.0389***  0.0357** 
  (-1.440)  (-1.224)  (-1.440)  (2.533)  (2.737)  (2.518) 
CAPEX  -0.4194*  -0.4076*  -0.4196*  0.0241  0.0251  0.0239 
  (-1.874)  (-1.795)  (-1.873)  (0.525)  (0.540)  (0.520) 
GROWTH  0.0686  0.0732  0.0687  -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0006 
  (0.607)  (0.652)  (0.607)  (-0.116)  (-0.013)  (-0.109) 
MTB  -0.0032  -0.0039  -0.0032  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0005 
  (-0.791)  (-0.934)  (-0.784)  (-0.789)  (-0.858)  (-0.769) 
PEMP  -0.9548***    -0.9526***  -0.0979***    -0.0965*** 
  (-3.658)    (-3.616)  (-3.506)    (-3.415) 
PEMPSHARE    0.1526  0.0422    0.0401  0.0304 
    (0.518)  (0.144)    (1.182)  (0.908) 
STATE  0.0003  -0.0020*  0.0003  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.243)  (-1.882)  (0.227)  (1.279)  (-0.747)  (1.177) 
FAM  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0003***  -0.0003***  -0.0003*** 
  (-0.542)  (-0.508)  (-0.53)  (-3.497)  (-3.399)  (-3.443) 
EO  -0.0095***  -0.0119***  -0.0097***  -0.0013***  -0.0016***  -0.0014*** 
  (-3.637)  (-3.863)  (-3.433)  (-4.711)  (-4.046)  (-3.936) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.5534*  -0.4471  -0.5528*  0.0260  0.0367*  0.0263 
  (-1.939)  (-1.570)  (-1.939)  (1.357)  (1.855)  (1.375) 
R²  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.31  0.30  0.31 
Adjusted R²  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.29  0.28  0.29 
N  810  810  810  815  815  815 
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Table 6 - Board meeting frequency and employee directors 
The table presents results from regressing the number of annual board meetings (MEETINGS) on various firm, ownership 
and board characteristics. The sample includes 156 firms listed on the SBF 120 Index, covering 1,025 firm-years over the 
period 1998-2005. We cap MEETINGS at the 99
th percentile to reduce the weight of extreme values. LSIZE is the natural 
log of the book value of total assets. ROA is the lagged Return on Assets measured as operating income over total assets. 
MTB is the lagged Market-to-Book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book 
value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage 
change in net sales for two years. COMMITTEES is the total number of standing board committees. DSHIPS is the average 
number of directorships in listed companies which is the total number of directorship posts held by directors in listed 
companies divided by the total number of directors. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on 
the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. EO is the 
ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. FAM is the ratio of the 
number of shares of all classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares 
of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The 
table presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N 
is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
Variables  MEETINGS  MEETINGS  MEETINGS 
LSIZE  -0.0348  -0.0034  -0.0329 
  (-0.625)  (-0.060)  (-0.592) 
ROA  -7.7858***  -7.7034***  -7.7477*** 
  (-4.836)  (-4.784)  (-4.804) 
GROWTH  0.7672***  0.7440***  0.7620*** 
  (4.329)  (4.267)  (4.327) 
SUPERVISORY  -1.3474***  -1.4649***  -1.3657*** 
  (-7.578)  (-8.108)  (-7.607) 
PEMP  4.0055***    3.9276*** 
  (2.647)    (2.602) 
PEMPSHARE    -2.5169  -2.0941 
    (-1.185)  (-1.014) 
EO  -0.0237  -0.0045  -0.0159 
  (-1.322)  (-0.249)  (-0.886) 
FAM  -0.0008  -0.0017  -0.0012 
  (-0.164)  (-0.331)  (-0.244) 
STATE  0.0032  0.0110*  0.0041 
  (0.573)  (1.860)  (0.721) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  8.9506***  8.5402***  8.9357*** 
  (9.637)  (9.050)  (9.627) 
       
R²  0.19  0.18  0.19 
Adjusted R²  0.16  0.16  0.16 
N  806  806  806 
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Table 7 - Determinants of Employee Directors Appointments on Boards of Directors 
The  table  reports  results  from  regressing  the  percentages  of  employee  directors,  directors  elected  from  among  the 
employees and from among the employee-shareholders and the presence of employee directors, directors elected from 
among the employees and from among the employee-shareholders on various board and firm characteristics. We estimate 
these percentages via Tobit regressions. The sample includes 156 firms listed on the SBF 120 Index, covering 1,025 firm-
years over the period 1998-2005. As in La Porta et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001), firms with negative net income, 
negative cash flow and firms whose dividends exceed sales are excluded. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from 
among  the  employees  on  the  board.  PEMPSHARE  is  the  fraction  of  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-
shareholders on the board. SIZE is the natural log of the book value of total assets. LEVERAGE is the leverage of the firm 
measured as total debt over total assets. QTOBIN is the Tobin’s Q defined as the market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal  year  plus  the  book  value  of  assets  minus  the  book  value  of  equity,  all  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets. 
CEO/CHAIR is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. WOMEN 
is  the  fraction  of  women  directors  on  the  board. The  table  presents  the  coefficients  and  Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
(White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the 
sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables  PEMP  PEMPSHARE 
LSIZE  0.0083***  0.0005 
  (6.567)  (0.739) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0316**  -0.0030 
  (-2.298)  (-0.414) 
QTOBIN  -0.0004  -0.0001 
  (-0.454)  (-0.060) 
EO  0.0020***  0.0044*** 
  (3.372)  (4.194) 
FAM  -0.0001**  -0.0001*** 
  (-2.229)  (-3.270) 
STATE  0.0016***  0.0004*** 
  (5.067)  (3.555) 
WOMEN  0.0546***  0.0037 
  (4.484)  (0.506) 
CEO/CHAIR  0.0217***  0.0046** 
  (6.404)  (2.030) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.1242***  -0.0069 
  (-6.599)  (-0.624) 
     
R²  0.34  0.24 
Adjusted R²  0.32  0.22 
N  859  859 
 
   - 41 -
Table 8. Dividend policy and employee representation on corporate boards controlling for endogeneity  
This table reports the second stage of a 2SLS regression, using the regressions reported in Table 7 as the first stage. The second stage 
uses the predicted value from the first stage to instrument the endogeneous choice variables. The dependent variables are the dividend 
payout ratio (PAYOUT) constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net income, the ratio 
of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net sales (DIV/SALES), the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net 
income (REP/NETINC), the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net sales (REP/SALES), the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and 
preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net income (CREP/NETINC) and the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and 
preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net sales (CREP/SALES) on various firm, ownership and board characteristics. 
The sample includes 156 firms listed on the SBF 120 Index, covering 1,025 firm-years over the period 1998-2005. As in La Porta et al. 
(2000) and Faccio et al. (2001), firms with negative net income, negative cash flow and firms whose dividends exceed sales are excluded. 
We cap all the dependent variables at the 99
th percentile to reduce the weight of extreme values. LSIZE is the natural log of the book 
value of total assets. ROA is Return on Assets measured as operating income over total assets. LEVERAGE is the leverage of the firm 
measured as total debt over total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales for two years. CAPEX is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. MTB is the lagged Market-to-Book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. PEMP is the fraction of directors 
elected  from  among  the  employees  on  the  board.  PEMPSHARE  is  the  fraction  of  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-
shareholders on the board. EO is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding). FAM 
is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of 
shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The table 
presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of 
non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variables  PAYOUT  PAYOUT  PAYOUT  DIV/SALES  DIV/SALES  DIV/SALES 
LSIZE  0.0148  -0.0001  0.0206**  0.0013  -0.0031***  0.0026** 
  (1.470)  (-0.017)  (2.058)  (0.983)  (-3.204)  (2.071) 
ROA  0.2495  0.0207  -0.1652  0.1076***  0.0575  0.0078 
  (1.255)  (0.071)  (-0.554)  (3.725)  (1.430)  (0.195) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0447  0.0018  -0.1189  0.0088  0.0243**  -0.0089 
  (-0.487)  (0.023)  (-1.307)  (0.779)  (2.211)  (-0.747) 
CAPEX  -0.4121**  -0.4110**  -0.4757**  -0.0137  -0.0091  -0.0277 
  (-2.089)  (-2.085)  (-2.353)  (-0.494)  (-0.341)  (-1.011) 
GROWTH  -0.1274***  -0.1219***  -0.1223***  -0.0075*  -0.0058  -0.0069* 
  (-3.492)  (-3.346)  (-3.364)  (-1.939)  (-1.434)  (-1.869) 
MTB  0.001  0.0027  0.0042  0.0002  0.0005  0.0010** 
  (0.357)  (0.834)  (1.308)  (0.476)  (1.270)  (2.306) 
PEMP  -2.5532**    -3.5852***  -0.7456***    -0.9905*** 
  (-1.991)    (-2.606)  (-4.659)    (-5.835) 
PEMPSHARE    4.0280  9.0440*    0.8244*  2.1806*** 
    (0.875)  (1.833)    (1.694)  (4.141) 
STATE  0.0055*  -0.0010  0.0060*  0.0016***  -0.0002*  0.0017*** 
  (1.786)  (-0.800)  (1.930)  (4.437)  (-1.664)  (4.742) 
FAM  -0.0014***  -0.0011  -0.0005  -0.0002***  -0.0001*  0.0000 
  (-2.811)  (-1.616)  (-0.767)  (-3.284)  (-1.733)  (0.187) 
EO  -0.0038  -0.0242  -0.0401**  -0.0002  -0.0047**  -0.0090*** 
  (-1.474)  (-1.243)  (-1.976)  (-0.755)  (-2.301)  (-4.143) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.1057  0.2441**  -0.0086  -0.0107  0.0318**  -0.0375** 
  (0.771)  (2.002)  (-0.059)  (-0.670)  (2.438)  (-2.376) 
R²  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.31  0.29  0.32 
Adjusted R²  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.29  0.27  0.3 
N  812  812  812  812  812  812 
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Table 8 - Continued 
 
Variables  REP/NETINC REP/NETINC REP/NETINC  REP/SALES  REP/SALES  REP/SALES 
LSIZE  0.0286***  0.0170***  0.0319***  0.0014***  0.0009**  0.0017*** 
  (3.582)  (3.154)  (3.846)  (2.809)  (2.058)  (3.374) 
ROA  0.3768**  0.2664  0.1354  0.0271**  0.0111  0.0041 
  (2.086)  (1.218)  (0.628)  (2.522)  (0.791)  (0.290) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0515  -0.0071  -0.0945  0.0014  0.0020  -0.0028 
  (-0.543)  (-0.087)  (-1.286)  (0.273)  (0.392)  (-0.588) 
CAPEX  -0.0792  -0.0703  -0.1154  -0.0088  -0.0099  -0.0125* 
  (-0.763)  (-0.616)  (-0.952)  (-1.333)  (-1.484)  (-1.692) 
GROWTH  0.0311  0.0356*  0.0326  0.0022  0.0025  0.0024 
  (1.491)  (1.770)  (1.611)  (0.806)  (0.926)  (0.873) 
MTB  -0.0018  -0.0011  0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0000 
  (-0.665)  (-0.388)  (0.026)  (-1.316)  (-0.511)  (-0.152) 
PEMP  -2.0074*    -2.6044**  -0.0837    -0.1424* 
  (-1.763)    (-2.193)  (-1.064)    (-1.744) 
PEMPSHARE    1.7175  5.2913    0.3186  0.5175** 
    (0.365)  (1.072)    (1.267)  (1.995) 
STATE  0.0036  -0.0012  0.0039  0.0001  -0.0001**  0.0001 
  (1.365)  (-1.084)  (1.481)  (0.633)  (-2.304)  (0.783) 
FAM  0.0005  0.0006  0.0010  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.820)  (0.963)  (1.553)  (0.528)  (1.079)  (1.578) 
EO  0.0018  -0.0082  -0.0195  0.0000  -0.0015  -0.0021* 
  (0.964)  (-0.411)  (-0.951)  (-0.037)  (-1.343)  (-1.902) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.5643**  -0.4491*  -0.6300***  -0.0199**  -0.0164**  -0.0264*** 
  (-2.301)  (-1.911)  (-2.854)  (-2.519)  (-2.018)  (-3.312) 
R²  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Adjusted R²  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04 
N  810  810  810  813  813  813 
 
 